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ABSTRACT 
This thesis reconstmcts the history of the theory of nuclear deterrence and the 
discipline of strategic sttidies in the period 1946 to 1960. The key elements of the 
theory were the view that nuclear weapons were qualitatively different from 
conventional weapons, that "deterrence" was the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, 
and that in order to fiilfil this purpose the weapons' retaliatory capability had to be 
protected from enemy attack. This amounted to a prescription for the non-use of 
nuclear weapons in any capacity by eittier side, ft is argued ttiat the tiieoiy of 
deterrence underwent a process of systematisation and formalisation during the 
1950s. This process involved the application of systems analysis and game ttieory 
to sttategic analysis and led to the emergence of sttategic sttidies. 
ft is also argued that strategic studies was developed in emulation of economics, 
particularly neo-classical and quantitative economics. The sttategic ttieorists who 
were responsible for the development of die ttieoiy and discipline equated 
quantitative sttategic analysis with good sttategic analysis. Both systems analysis 
and game ttieory served as vehicles for the application of the methods of 
quantitative economics to die analysis of "deteixence" and its requirements. As the 
systematisation and formalisation of the theory took die view that "deterrence" 
was the sole purpose of nuclear weapons to a higher level of absttaction so did die 
dieory, and die discipline, become increasingly irrelevant to die practical concems 
of American policy makers and mihtary planners. The policy makers and planners 
saw no qualitative difference between conventional and nuclear weapons. They 
dierefore did not accept die view that die sole purpose of nuclear weapons was 
"deten-ence" as die theorists understood die term. Moreover, by die mid 1950s die 
military planners in particular had come to die conclusion that die only way to 
"deter" an enemy nuclear sttike was to pre-empt it. ft is argued in die thesis that 
die dieorists' awareness of die yawning gap between dieir and die poHcy makers' 
and planners' conception of die purpose of nuclear weapons was of paradigmatic 
importance for die dieory and die discipline. 
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